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As school leaders, principals can influence student achievement in a number of ways, such as: hiring and 
firing teachers, monitoring instruction, and maintaining student discipline, among others. We measure the 
effect of individual principals on gains in student math and reading achievement between grades four and 
seven. We estimate that a one standard deviation improvement in principal quality can boost student 
performance by approximately 0.2 standard deviations in both math and reading. We also show that 
principal experience does not exert a significant influence on student performance. Our results imply that 
isolating the most effective principals and allocating them accordingly  between schools can have a 
significant positive effect on reducing achievement gaps. 
 
*We thank Kelly Bedard, Mati Dubrovinsky, David Johnson, Harry Krashinsky, Abigail Payne, Simon 
Woodcock, and various seminar participants for helpful comments.  1 
 
I. Introduction 
The summer of 2008 saw widespread media coverage of controversial Washington D.C. school 
chancellor Michelle Rhee and her move to fire roughly 40 school principals in her district. Many of the 
schools in question were failing to meet the academic proficiency standards of the No Child Left Behind 
Act, and this change in school leadership was meant to help these struggling schools improve their 
performance. Not only does this move highlight the value that school districts place on quality leadership 
within a school, but it also demonstrates an underlying belief that principals have an effect on student 
achievement within their schools. As the main administrator in a school, the principal is responsible, 
among other things, for maintaining and improving teacher quality, monitoring and enforcing student 
conduct, and ensuring the curriculum is properly implemented. However, despite the importance of these 
functions in contributing to the educational experience, much of the economics research to this point has 
focused on teacher quality rather than principal quality.  
In this paper we quantify the importance of principals in the production of student test score gains 
between fourth and seventh grade using principal fixed effects estimated from longitudinal administrative 
data from the province of British Columbia (BC), Canada. Principal fixed effects measure the impact of 
all unchanging characteristics of a principal that are transferrable between schools, such as leadership 
ability, personality, and gender. We obtain these estimates for math and reading scores using a value-
added model that controls for observable time-varying student, school, and neighborhood factors, along 
with fixed school effects. The frequent mobility of principals between schools in BC allows us to identify 
principal effects using within school variation, which is important because school fixed effects remove 
the influence of fixed school characteristics that might bias estimated principal effects if principals sort 
across schools based on those attributes. We also extend the model to allow for “match effects,” where 
part of the principal effect is portable across schools, and part depends on the school where they are 
employed. Finally, we estimate the effect of experience as a principal within a school (which we call 
tenure), and overall experience as a principal on student achievement.  2 
 
We estimate that a one standard deviation move up the distribution of principal quality leads to an 
improvement of approximately 0.2 standard deviations in both math and reading score gains. When we 
extend the model to include match effects, we find that roughly half of that effect is due to the match 
between principal and school, and that the standard deviation of the match effects is 0.160. Given the 
importance of good principals and good matches between principals and schools, properly allocating 
principals to schools is an important policy consideration, especially in terms of reducing achievement 
gaps. In terms of principal experience, we find that more experienced principals and those with a longer 
tenure in a school have no significant impact on student performance. This implies that, at least in BC, 
what matters for student achievement is finding a principal with good fixed attributes and assigning that 
individual to the correct school.  
 
II. Existing Literature on the Effect of Principals 
  Despite the extensive literature on teacher quality, relatively little attention has been paid by 
economists to the importance of principals in the production of student achievement.
1 The existing 
economics literature related to our research can be separated into three strands.
2 The first focuses on 
estimating the overall effect of the principal on achievement, the second on the effects of specific 
principal attributes on achievement and the third on the effects of specific principal training programs
3  
Most closely related to our research are two recent papers by Coelli and Green (forthcoming) and 
Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2010) focus on the overall effect of the principal on achievement.
4 Coelli 
and Green (forthcoming) use a sample of students entering grade 12 drawn from administrative data in 
                                                 
1 Some recent studies regarding teaching quality are: Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007), Buddin and Zamarro 
(2009), Harris and Sass (2006), Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges (2004), 
Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), Rockoff (2004), and Sanders and Rivers (1996). 
2 Education scholars have studied principal effectiveness extensively. See Hallinger and Heck (1998) for a 
discussion of the more qualitative education research regarding principal effectiveness that has generally relied on 
teacher reports of principal attributes and leadership styles. 
3 In addition, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) find that for mobile principals, the information provided by the school's test 
scores allow principals whose schools do better to earn more by getting promoted to higher paying positions at other 
schools and at higher levels within the district.  
4 Grissom and Loeb (2009) find that only the self-assessment of organizational management skills predicts growth in 
state-assigned school grades. Horng, Klasik, and Loeb (2009) similarly find that time spent dedicated to 
organizational management also is related to state-assigned grades.  3 
 
BC to estimate the effect of principals on high school graduation and grade 12 provincial exam scores in 
English.
5 In their main analysis, they estimate the lower bound of the variance of principal effects on the 
outcomes above using the method formulated by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), which was 
originally used to estimate teacher effects. They find that moving one standard deviation up in the 
distribution of principal effects can improve both outcomes, but has a particularly significant effect on 
grade 12 English scores. They also estimate a dynamic model of principal effects and find that that a 
principal’s full impact is not immediate, but instead increases gradually over time. Even though we both 
draw our samples from BC data and estimate the dispersion of principal effects on outcomes, our research 
is best viewed as a complement to Coelli and Green (forthcoming) because of fundamental differences. 
The main difference is in the populations under analysis: we study elementary school students and they 
study high school students. Secondly, though our empirical strategies rely on similar identifying 
assumptions, they are different in that we use a value-added approach rather than a levels approach. We 
focus on value-added because our outcomes will depend on cumulative inputs from various sources. 
Finally, in addition to providing estimates of fixed principal effects, we also estimate match effects. 
  Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2010) use data from Texas to estimate the importance of 
principals on student math and reading test score gains using data from the first three years of a 
principal’s tenure at a school. In their main analysis, they estimate principal fixed effects in a value-added 
model, and present summary statistics based on those effects. They find a significant amount of 
dispersion in the principal effects overall, and that this dispersion is higher in low-income schools. They 
also find that principals in the middle of the quality distribution are generally more likely to stay at the 
school after three years, and that this pattern does not vary with the school’s poverty level. They support 
their conclusions that what they estimate is a principal quality effect by showing that when high quality 
principals lead schools, the teachers who exit are of comparably worse quality. While similar to our 
research, the main specification in Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin (2010) excludes school fixed effects. 
                                                 
5 Using the same data, Coelli, Green, and Warburton (2007) examine the effect of graduating on Income Assistance 
receipt in Canada. As one of their identification strategies, they use principal fixed effects as instrumental variables 
for graduation. 4 
 
Though they mention that variance estimates are similar when school effects are included, it is difficult to 
imagine that principal mobility is uncorrelated with school quality, so excluding these controls will 
confound the effects of principal and school.  
The second strand of the literature on principal effects focuses on the relationship between 
principal observable characteristics and school performance. Many of these papers focus on the role of 
principal education and experience on school performance, and have found mixed results. In terms of 
education, some researchers find that a more educated principal worsens the school's performance (see 
Ballou and Podgursky, 1993 and Eberts and Stone, 1988), whereas other researchers find no relationship 
(see Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff, 2009). In addition, Eberts and Stone (1988) and Clark, Martorell, and 
Rockoff (2009) find a positive correlation between teaching experience and school performance, but 
Brewer (1993) finds no correlation.  
The third strand of the literature examines the effects of principal training programs. For example, 
Corcoran, Schwartz, and Weinstein (2009) show that principals trained in the New York City Aspiring 
Principals Program have positive effects on school performance. Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009), 
however, find mixed evidence on the relationship between formal principal training/development 
programs and school achievement.  
Our research adds to the principal literature in several ways. Our main contribution is to measure 
the effectiveness of individual principals within a framework that controls for potential confounding 
school factors. We also relax the restriction that principal effects are fixed across schools by estimating 
the contribution of the principal-school match to student achievement. There are many reasons to think 
that principal effectiveness depends on the school environment where they work, so this is an important 
step forward in determining why principals matter for student achievement. Finally, we are also able to 
explore the effect of principal tenure at a school and overall principal experience, as these factors have the 




III. Education in British Columbia 
The public school system in BC is very similar to other jurisdictions across Canada and the 
United States. There are 60 school districts in BC, many of which correspond to city boundaries in the 
populated areas (Vancouver and its surrounding area and Victoria). In the more rural areas, districts 
correspond to a much wider area. Prior to 2003, students attending public schools were required to attend 
the school located in their catchment area. Since 2003, legislation has existed that allows parents to 
choose any public school. However, it is not clear that this legislation has been successful in creating 
widespread public school choice (DeCicca and Smith, 2011). Approximately, 30 percent of students 
attend a middle or junior high school that begins in either sixth or seventh grade, and the other 70 percent 
attend a school whose grades extend through seventh grade and higher (Dhuey, 2011). Therefore, the 
majority of the students in our sample will have the opportunity to stay at the same school between grade 
four and seven.
6 
Each year since 1999, students in fourth and seventh grade are tested in reading, writing, and 
math using the Foundation Skills Assessment (FSA) tests. All students are expected to participate in the 
tests, with the exception of some ESL students and students with special needs. These tests are low stakes 
in the sense that no funding is tied to the outcome of these exams, nor do they contribute to student course 
grades. Therefore, despite recent work regarding teacher and principal cheating, principal cheating on 
these exams is unlikely, mainly due to the fact that principal compensation and school resources are set 
according to guidelines that are not based on student outcomes (Coelli and Green, forthcoming).  
  Principals in British Columbia are appointed by the school board, and their duties are outlined in 
various parts of the School Act from the Revised Statutes of BC and are specifically listed in BC 
Regulation 265/89 and the many amendments thereof. BC principals are typical of most principals across 
jurisdictions. They are responsible for carrying out orders from the school district or from the Ministry of 
Education, and they are also responsible for making sure the instructional practices of their school 
                                                 
6 We include a robustness check that includes only students that attend the same school (see Table 6, Panel D). The 
results are not substantially different.  6 
 
conform to the School Act. In addition, they are responsible for the smooth functioning of the province’s 
various standardized testing programs. Unlike some other jurisdictions, principals do not directly hire and 
fire teachers; instead they provide information to the school district about teacher performance, and any 
disciplinary action is then decided at this upper level. Finally, they carry out various administrative tasks 
such as making teacher timetables, maintaining school records, and monitoring the conduct of students. 
 
IV. Empirical Specification 
  To estimate the principal effects, we use the following value-added model of students’ test scores. 

















                        
                (1) 
where   is the grade seven math or reading score for student i in school s with principal p;   is the 
student’s corresponding grade four score;   is a vector of student-level characteristics;   is a vector 
of school-level characteristics;   is a set of dummy variables equal to 1 if principal p has j years of 
experience in year t; , , and  are fixed effects at the principal, school, and year level, respectively; 
 is an idiosyncratic error term.
7 
  To describe the effect of principals on student achievement, we examine summary statistics based 
on the set of principal fixed effects, in particular their standard deviation. These principal fixed effects are 
interpreted as the effect of each individual principal on achievement that is invariant across time, students, 
and schools conditional on other time-varying and time-invariant student and school-level factors. This 
effect will measure the impact of any fixed attribute of the principal, such as leadership ability, gender, 
education, and training. 
                                                 
7 We model value-added over three years, whereas other models in the literature use one-year gains. This might lead 
our estimates to be higher than they would be if we used a comparable one-year value-added model.  We explore 

























  We estimate equation 1 using fixed effects methods, treating   as parameters to be estimated. 
Normally, fixed effects are used to control for unobserved heterogeneity when researchers are trying to 
identify other coefficients in the model. In that scenario, the fixed effects are generally never explicitly 
estimated, but rather swept away by a within transformation. Our primary focus, however, is on the 
estimates of the principal fixed effects themselves, which adds several complications in terms of 
estimation. If we first consider the case where we do not include the school effects, we cannot separately 
identify all of the principal effects when the model contains a constant (the “dummy variable trap”); an 
identifying restriction must be imposed. The most obvious restriction is to simply set one principal effect 
equal to zero. This is unsatisfactory for our purposes because it forces the interpretation of the remaining 
fixed effects to be deviations from the dropped principal, which is sensitive to which principal is dropped. 
Instead, we restrict the fixed effects to sum to zero as in Mihaly et al. (2010). With this restriction, the 
principal effects are interpreted as deviations from the average of the principal effects.  
The problem becomes more complicated when we include both principal and school effects. 
Principals and schools are implicitly separated into many disconnected groups because not every principal 
works at every school. Each group contains all principals that have ever worked at any school in the 
group, and all schools that have ever employed any principal in the group. Principals in one group are 
never observed working at a school in any other group, and schools in one group never employ a principal 
from any other group. When including school fixed effects, one principal effect in each group is not 
identified, and additional restrictions must be imposed.
8 Following Mihaly et al. (2010), when the model 
contains principal and school effects, we restrict the principal effects to sum to zero within each group. 
The principal effects in this case are interpreted as deviations from the within-group mean. 
One consequence of including school effects in the model is that principal effects must vary 
within schools to be identified. In our case, at least one school in each group must employ multiple 
                                                 
8 In the estimation, within each group the sum of the principal dummies equals the sum of the school dummies. 
Thus, one principal dummy in each group is dropped. Alternatively, one could drop one school dummy from each 
group. Because this model does not include a constant, we keep all school dummies in the regression. 8 
 
principals over time to contribute to estimation. This arises mainly through principal mobility across 
schools, but can also occur when new principals enter the sample. In the extreme case where a group 
contains exactly one principal and one school (i.e. the principal does not move and the school does not 
employ any other principal), principal effects are not identified and therefore not estimated. The reported 
standard deviations based on the school fixed effects specification use only identified principal fixed 
effects. Thus, principal mobility is crucial for our estimation. Fortunately there is enough mobility to 
identify an effect for most principals in the school effects model (see Table 1). Despite the fact that we 
can only identify principal effects for the subset of identified principals, it is our preferred specification 
because controlling for fixed school factors is crucial. We examine the difference between “identified” 
and “unidentified” principals in Section V.C.  
  Our estimates of the standard deviation of the principal effects may be upwardly biased due to 
sampling error. As explained in Kane and Staiger (2002), and noted in Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 
(2010), Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007), and Jacob and Lefgren (2005 and 2008), even in the 
absence of any real principal effect, we still might observe variations in the estimated effect due to 
random differences between samples of students. Such sampling variation is a problem particularly when 
a principal fixed effect is based on a small number of students. To correct for this, we adjust the standard 
deviation downward using an estimate of the variation of the sampling error.
9 Following Aaronson, 
Barrow, and Sander (2007) and Jacob and Lefgren (2005 and 2008), we assume the estimated principal 
effect is the sum of the true effect and a mean-zero, independent, normally distributed error 
p p p ν δ δ + = ˆ . Due to independence, the variance of the estimated principal effect is the sum of the 
variances of the true effect and the error 
2 2 2
ˆ ν δ δ σ σ σ + = . We obtain the true principal effect variance 
                                                 
9 While shrinking our estimates are important in this estimation, shrinking of estimates will generally be much more 
important in the case of teachers as they have more variation in class size and in the number of students tested each 
year which will generate more variation in the precision of teacher fixed effects versus principal fixed effects.  9 
 
by subtracting the error variance from the variance of the estimated principal effect. Because   is 
unknown, we estimate it by taking the square of the average of the standard errors of  .  
In addition to shrinking our original estimate of the standard deviation of principal effects 
estimated above, we also compute the standard deviation of an Empirical Bayes estimate of the principal 
effects. As in Jacob and Lefgren (2005), if  ) , 0 ( ~
2
δ σ δ N p , then conditional on observing our “noisy” 
estimate of the principal effect,
 
ˆ  δ  p =δp +ν p, a Bayesian estimate of the mean of the principal effect 
would shrink our existing estimates based on a signal to noise ratio: 


















= =  . If our estimate  contains mostly noise, then the estimates shrink 
toward zero.
10 Using our estimates of  𝜎𝗿
2  and  , we can construct the Empirical Bayes estimate 𝗿𝑝  by 
substituting those values into the equation above. Estimates will shrink more toward zero the higher the 
noise matters relative to the signal.
11  
 
V. Data and Analysis Sample 
A. Data Sources 
  Our main datasets are three linked files obtained from the Ministry of Education in BC. The first 
contains observations on all students writing the FSA test in the period 1999 through 2006. For these 
students, we know the percentage score on each test, the school in which the test is written, and whether 
                                                 
10 If we assume more generally that  ) , ( ~
2
δ σ δ δ p p N
, then


































and a noisy estimate would be shrunk towards the prior mean. Our assumption that  0 = p δ  is akin to reinterpreting 
the principal effects as deviations from means, which is the correct interpretation of the estimates we produce. 
11 Sampling error makes the variance of the Empirical Bayes estimates lower than the variance of the actual 
principal quality (see Jacob and Lefgren, 2005). Therefore, we adjust this variance upward by adding in the estimate 
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the student was “excused” from the test.
12 Student scores are linked over time via an encrypted student 
identifier.  
  Student test scores are linked via the student identifier to a file containing the administrative 
records of all public school students in BC from 1999–2006 in grades four to seven. These data include 
information on gender, aboriginal status, participation in Special Education or English as a Second 
Language (ESL) programs, and each student’s residential postal code. In urban areas, postal codes are 
very small area consisting sometimes of one side of a city block. In less-populated areas, they can 
coincide with part or all of a town. We use postal codes to link Dissemination/Enumeration Area (DA) 
level information from the Canada Census as proxies for students’ Socio-Economic Status (SES).
13 DAs 
are relatively small areas that are designed to contain roughly 400–700 people, and as such act as a 
reasonable proxy for a student’s SES. We attach information on household income, average dwelling 
value, education levels, unemployment rates, ethnic and immigrant composition, and the age distribution 
of each DA.   
  The third file contains information on all public schools in British Columbia from 1995 through 
2006. For each school we know information such as what grades are offered, the number of teachers, and 
each school’s exact address and postal code. Most importantly, we know the name of the principal, which 
we use to create principal fixed effects in the econometric specification.
14 To this dataset we append 
principal names and school numbers dating back to 1989, transcribed from the Public and Independent 
Schools Book, a document produced by the Ministry of Education in BC. These additional data allow us 
to create a more precise measure of principal experience.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Students with poor English abilities and some students with severe disabilities are excused from writing provincial 
exams. 
13 This process is described in detail in a data appendix that is available from the authors upon request.  
14 The data were checked extensively to ensure that typos, misspellings, and name changes (due, for example, to 
marriage) did not result in identifying one individual as two different individuals. 11 
 
B. Descriptive Statistics on Principals  
  We begin by analyzing descriptive statistics for the principals in our data, with a focus on 
mobility, which is key for our estimation strategy. In this section, we restrict our attention to the years 
1999–2006, since those are the years for which we have data on school and student demographics. We 
also restrict the sample to elementary, middle, and elementary-secondary schools to keep the focus on the 
student population of interest. Table 1 contains basic statistics about the number, mobility and experience 
of principals in British Columbia. Between 1255 and 1362 principals are employed each year, and 
between 117 and 178 of them are newly hired into the system. The main factors affecting the number of 
principals hired each year are retirements in the previous year (which depends on the age of those within 
the cohort of principals at that time) and school openings or closings in a particular year.  
  Between 69 and 77 percent of principals stay in the same school from one year to the next. 
Eleven to fifteen percent moved to a different school within British Columbia and 10–18 percent leave the 
sample. This latter group includes those principals who retired, those who moved out of province, and 
those who stop working as a principal but remain in the system in some other capacity.  
  Each year, roughly one quarter of the sampled principals are in their first year of tenure at a 
school, and another quarter remain at the same school for five or more years. The other half remain at the 
same school between two and four years. This shows considerable turnover of principals within schools, 
which helps our estimation strategy because we need multiple principals at each school to be able to 
identify the principal fixed effects. Finally, about one third of principals are in their first three years of 






                                                 
15 Given that we can observe principals back to 1989, the longest a principal employed in 1999 can be seen in our 
sample is 10 years, while in the 2006 sample, the longest a principal can be seen is 18 years. 12 
 
C. Regression Sample 
  Because we estimate a value-added model in test scores, we restrict our focus to students who 
wrote both the fourth- and seventh-grade mathematics and reading exams.
16 Since we observe test scores 
between 1999 and 2006, and since three years pass between each test, most such students are observed 
between 2002 and 2006. There are 229,337 students observed in the grade seven test data between 2002 
and 2006. We drop 27,286 of these students (11.9 percent) who are not observed in all years between 
grades four and seven, and a further 14,692 students (6.5 percent) who do not have a valid test score in 
both years. We also drop 657 students (< 1 percent) who are missing school information in grades five or 
six . Finally, we drop 3,079 students (1.3 percent) who are in schools that have less than ten test takers. 
Our final analysis sample consists of 183,623 student observations . 
  The summary statistics in Table 2 regarding test scores, demographics, and neighborhood census 
characteristics are based on this sample of 183,623 students. The fourth- and seventh-grade math and 
reading test scores are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one in the 
population. The means of these test scores are slightly positive in our analysis sample, which indicates 
that the students who were excluded from the samples scored marginally worse than the students who 
were included in the samples. 
As we explained in Section IV, in the school fixed effects model, principal effects are only 
identified for a subset of principals. In Table 3 we compare sample means of observable characteristics 
for identified and unidentified principals from the regression sample. Column 1 pools all principals, and 
columns 2 and 3 restrict the sample to identified principals and unidentified principals, respectively. On 
average, the identified principals have slightly less experience and have shorter tenure in schools. This is 
not surprising because a principal needs to be mobile to be included in our sample. The other differences 
are that unidentified principals are more likely to be in rural areas (where it is more difficult to move), 
                                                 
16 We exclude the writing test due to the nature of the test and the distribution of the scores for that test. It is more 
difficult for graders to judge the “correctness” of answers to a writing test as compared to math and reading. In 
practice, the distribution shows that scores on the writing test tend to cluster around certain values, indicating that 
graders probably used a rubric to evaluate performance. Such clustering makes it difficult to differentiate between 
students and makes it difficult to justify using writing scores as an outcome variable. 13 
 
which in turn means the percent visible minority, immigrant, and ESL are lower. These principals also 
tend to belong to schools with slightly lower test scores. 
  
VI. Principal Mobility 
In our preferred specification, principal effects within schools are estimable because of principal 
mobility. The identifying assumption is that mobility is exogenous conditional on all the variables that 
appear in our model. In particular, if principals prefer schools located in high-income areas, or prefer 
schools with certain fixed attributes, this will not affect the causal interpretation. Rothstein (2010) shows 
that such random assignment is tenuous in the context of identifying teacher effects, because, for 
example, students may be sorted into classrooms based on lagged test score gains.
17 The identifying 
assumption, however, is much less tenuous in the context of principal effects. First, identification of a 
principal effect is not compromised when students are non-randomly assigned to teachers within a school; 
indeed, we posit that this is likely one of the mechanisms driving the principal effect. Second, the sorting 
of principals across schools is apt to be driven by school factors that are relatively fixed over the time 
period we consider in this analysis (five years), and since we control for fixed characteristics, this does 
not compromise identification. Finally, we control for many time-varying observed characteristics that 
may be related to principal mobility.  
In spite of the above, one may still worry that mobility is endogenous. For example, districts may 
remove principals from schools who perform poorly on current and lagged test scores, and if those scores 
are mean-reverting, we may mistakenly attribute a subsequent improvement in scores after a move to the 
incoming principal. As such, in this section we attempt to provide more information on the principal 
mobility process by first discussing the administrative rules governing principal mobility, and then using 
the data to assess how principals move based on observables.  
                                                 
17 Rothstein (2010) tests the identifying assumptions for teacher effects by checking whether current teacher 
assignment is related to past test score gains, conditional on past teacher assignment. In theory, one could repeat that 
exercise with principals. Due to data limitations (having only 2 time observations for each student), we cannot 
replicate that test in our paper because we cannot construct a lagged gain score. 14 
 
The administrative rules governing principal mobility in BC are discussed in detail by Coelli and 
Green (forthcoming). They find that mobility is determined at the school district level and is generally 
overseen by the Superintendent of Schools. Of the 60 districts in BC, 14 are found to mention principal 
rotation somewhere in their district policies; these 14 districts are larger than average in size. Their main 
example of a district policy towards rotation comes from the Vancouver School Board, whose written 
procedure is to transfer principals between schools roughly every five years. Other districts are sometimes 
less precise, stating in their district policies minimum and maximum times until principal transfer, leaving 
much discretion to the school district. Smaller districts that do not have written rotation procedures are 
found not to have included them in the district policy because there are too few schools to make such a 
strategy work.
18  
In Table 4 we empirically evaluate the determinants of principal mobility. We take a sample of all 
schools that offer the grade 7 FSA test between 1999 and 2006, and use a regression to relate principal 
mobility between those schools to observable characteristics of the principals and schools. We regress an 
indicator for a principal move between t and t+1 on school and neighborhood characteristics at time t (and 
in some specifications, t-1). In Columns 1-3 the dependent variable equals 1 only if the principal moves 
from one school to another school in the sample. In columns 4-6, the indicator equals 1 for any move, 
including switches to schools out of the sample or exits from the sample. Column 1 includes a full set of 
controls but excludes school fixed effects. Results show no evidence that principal turnover is related to 
any school and neighborhood characteristics, including math and reading test scores. Note in particular 
that the test score coefficients are very small and imprecise.
19 The main significant predictors of mobility 
are principal experience indicator variables. When we add school effects in Column 2, the conclusions do 
not change. Column 3 adds lagged test scores, and there continue to be no significant relationships. The 
                                                 
18 The British Columbia School Trustees Association has gathered every school district’s policies at the following 
website: http://www.bcsta.org:8080/docushare 
19 The unit of measurement of each test score variable is student-level standard deviations. A one standard deviation 
increase in student test scores is roughly equivalent to a 0.5 standard deviation increase in test scores at the school 
level. Thus, these results should be interpreted as roughly half of their reported size.  15 
 
same exercise is conducted in columns 4-6 for all switches. Once again, the only significant determinant 
of principal mobility is experience. Thus, while we cannot be certain that mobility is unrelated to 
unobservable factors that change during our time period, these results provide evidence that current and 
lagged school performance does not determine moves.  
 
VII. Results 
A. Variation in Principal Quality 
  Table 5 presents the baseline estimates from equation 1, and includes details on the distribution of 





th percentiles. Both the 
standard deviation and the adjusted standard deviation are included. In addition, the gap between the 75
th 
percentile and the median principal fixed effect is calculated as a representation of the difference between 
a "good" principal and an average principal. The number of principals and the number of schools used in 
the regression are listed along with the p-value for the F-test of the joint significance of   (i.e.,   =0 for 
all p). 
  Columns 1 and 6 present estimates of the distribution of the principal fixed effects from a 
specification that includes no demographic or census control variables, and no school fixed effects. This 
specification essentially computes the deviation of each principal’s average score across students from the 
mean principal. The estimates in column 1 imply that moving one standard deviation up the distribution 
of principals increases test scores by 0.336 standardized units in math. Comparing the principal at the 75
th 
percentile to the median leads to a more modest increase of 0.202 standardized student points. We find 
similar results in column 6, which shows the results from the reading test. The F-test of the joint 
significance of   easily rejects the null of no principal fixed effects at a high level of significance in both 
cases. After adjusting our estimates for sampling error, the standard deviation in column 1 drops to 0.321 








due to sampling error. Columns 2 and 7 add demographic and census control variables.
20 Estimates shrink 
slightly, but the story is largely unchanged. Interestingly, our estimates do not see the same kind of 
attenuation that was found in teacher effects when adding demographic control variables (see Aaronson, 
Barrow, and Sander 2007).  
  In Columns 3 and 8 we drop the principal effects that would be unidentified in a school fixed 
effects specification to assess the effect of limiting the sample of principals before explicitly including 
school fixed effects. This restriction decreases the number of principal effects estimated from 1323 to 
1077. The standard deviation does not change dramatically compared to columns 2 and 7. This provides 
some evidence that our sample used to estimate both school and principal effects is not biased due to 
sample selection.  
Columns 4 and 9 report estimates when school fixed effects are added to the model. Including 
school fixed effects is preferred because it holds constant all fixed school components like curriculum, 
school size, fixed family, and some community characteristics in computing principal effects. This is 
important because these factors may be highly correlated with principal effects, and because both fixed 
school components and principal effects impact student achievement. The estimated standard deviations 
are 0.231 and 0.224, and the adjusted standard deviations are 0.196 and 0.188 for math and reading, 
respectively. As before, the F-test rejects that the within-school principal fixed effects jointly equal zero 
at the one percent level.  
  Columns 5 and 10 show the Empirical Bayes estimates. These results indicate that an increase of 
one standard deviation increases math scores by 0.167 standardized units and reading scores by 0.158 
                                                 
20 These variables include an indicator for whether the student is male, aboriginal, or in special education, or has 
repeated a grade. It also includes the number of students enrolled in the school and the number of teachers, along 
with the number of students excused from the math test and reading test. In addition, it includes the percentage of 
students at each school who are males, who are in special education, and who are ESL. Finally, the following DA 
level community characteristics are also included: average household income, percentage of individuals with a high 
school diploma, percentage of individuals with a university degree, percentage of individuals 25 years or older who 
are unemployed, percentage of the population who are immigrants, percentage of the population who are visible 
minorities, average value of dwellings, and percentage of the population who are older than 65 years.  17 
 
standardized units. Comparing the principal at the 75
th percentile to the median gives a much more 
modest 0.076 unit increase for math scores and a 0.070 unit increase for reading. Note that when 
calculating Empirical Bayes estimates, the sampling error makes the variance of the estimates lower than 
the variance of the actual principal quality (see Jacob and Lefgren, 2005). Therefore, we adjust this 
variance upward by adding in our estimate of the variance of the sampling error. The adjusted estimates 
for math is an increase of 0.207 standardized units and an increase of 0.199 standardized units in reading. 
  The results in Table 5 show that overall, individual principals can have a substantial impact on 
student achievement in reading and math. How large are these effects? One way to interpret their size is 
to compare them against other inputs to student cognitive ability. Using a similar research design, 
Rockoff (2004) estimates teacher fixed effects using one-year test score gains. He estimates that the 
unadjusted standard deviation of estimated teacher effects is roughly 0.21 in reading and 0.29 in math, 
and the adjusted effect is 0.10 for reading and math. Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) estimate a 
standard deviation of 0.13 for teacher effects on math scores in Chicago. Note that compared against these 
teacher effects, our magnitudes are likely larger in part because we use gains over three years rather than 
one year as in most other studies (see the results in Table 6 below).  
  What types of fixed principal characteristics might contribute to the effects we observe? 
Principals are not likely to have a direct impact on student performance through their teaching ability, as 
they generally do not interact directly with students in the classroom. Thus, principals affect students 
through indirect channels; the most likely such channels are through teachers and overall school policies 
such as those that include changes to the curriculum. Good principals will hire the best teachers and fire 
the worst (Jacob 2010), match teachers to students based on ability, set appropriate timetables, and 
evaluate/monitor teacher performance. Principals are also in charge of setting school-level policies on 
issues such as instruction and discipline. In addition, principals are responsible for acting as a liaison 
between the school and the district, a role which will involve passing information from school to district 18 
 
and vice versa as well as making sure that district policies with respect to things like curriculum are 
implemented correctly.  
  All of these factors likely contribute in some way to what makes one principal better than 
another. Because we do not have data on the decisions and policies of these principals, we cannot uncover 
the independent influence of any of these factors, even though they would be of interest to policy makers. 
Nevertheless, our results are very useful in the sense that they can identify who are the good and bad 
principals in terms of increasing school-level achievement scores. Even without knowing the precise 
mechanism by which principals affect student performance, it is still possible for policy makers to use this 
information to improve student achievement in particular schools. This could be accomplished, for 
example, by identifying the best principals and allocating them strategically to underperforming schools 
in order to boost performance in those schools. Because the principal effects we estimate are fixed across 
time, this would not have any effect on aggregate achievement, but could help to reduce achievement 
gaps between good and bad schools.  
 
B. Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results, Table 6 replicates the results of Table 5 using different 
specifications or different samples.
21 We report only estimates that include school fixed effects.
 These 
estimates correspond to columns 4 and 5 for math and columns 9 and 10 for reading in Table 5. 
Therefore, the estimates in all columns include the demographic and census control variables in addition 
to school fixed effects.  
The estimates presented in Table 5 do not take into the account that students may have different 
levels of exposure to their grade seven principals. Therefore, for our first robustness check, in Panel A we 
multiply each principal indicator variable by the number of years the student is exposed to their grade 
                                                 
21 Appendix Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for each of these samples. Estimates of principal fixed effects 
without the inclusion of school fixed effects for this table are available from the authors upon request. 19 
 
seven principal. The effects will be very similar to 1-year gains if the principal effects are linear. Columns 
1 and 3 display the standard deviation and the adjusted standard deviation from equation 1 including the 
time with principal interactions. Columns 2 and 4 display both the Empirical Bayes standard deviation 
and adjusted standard deviation. The estimates in Panel A are 0.052-0.087 standard deviations lower than 
the corresponding estimates in Table 5. These estimates are the closest estimates to the single-year gains 
estimates from the teacher effect literature and have a similar magnitude to this literature. 
One problem with the results from Table 5 and the above robustness check is that they include 
effects for only grade seven principals. Students may have a different principal in grades 5 and 6, and 
these principals may impact grade 7 scores. In Panel B we generalize the principal effects in Panel A to 
equal to the number of years each student has been with any given principal between grades five and 
seven.
22 Including the additional principals increases the number of principal effects we can identify to 
1660 from 1323.
23 The estimates in Panel B are slightly larger than the estimates calculated in Table 5.  
In Panel C we estimate the set of principal fixed effects using only students who had the same 
principal in grades five through seven but had a different principal in grade four.
24 Using this sample, we 
can attribute most of the value added measure to the grade seven principal. These estimates are also 
slightly larger than the estimates found in Table 5.  
Panel D limits the sample to students who stayed in the same school between grades four and 
seven. The purpose of this exercise is to see if the results are robust to student sorting across schools in 
search of a better principal. We have mostly been concerned with principals choosing to work in the best 
schools, but an equally plausible, although less likely, situation is that parents locate near a school 
                                                 
22 The sample size is smaller for in this regression because we needed to drop students who were in schools with 
very few students in grades 5 and 6. 
23 This increase in the number of principals arises for two reasons. First, there are a small number of principals who 
are not observed in grade seven, but are observed in grades five or six. Second, adding these principals creates 
additional connections between principals and schools, which allows us to identify principal effects among grade 
seven principals that were previously not identifiable. 
24 These estimates are similar to the estimates if we use the sample of students who had the same principal in grade 
five-seven but not necessarily a different principal in grade four.  20 
 
because of the principal. The results from this exercise are similar to the main results. This suggests that 
student sorting is not causing substantial bias in our results.  
Finally, our results might be driven by trends in test scores over time, which would not be 
absorbed by our fixed effects, and could persist even though we control for time-varying factors. In Panel 
E, we add school-specific linear time trends to the specification. Estimation is problematic in this case 
because a school is observed for a maximum of five years, and it is therefore difficult to statistically 
estimate these trends. Indeed, we were not able to identify a trend for schools that had a different principal 
in each year in the sample, or were observed for too few years (100 schools out of 912). The results show 
a higher standard deviation in principal effects in both math and reading. A significant amount of the 
increase in dispersion is driven by noise, as evidenced by the difference between the adjusted and 
unadjusted standard deviations. These results suggest that if there is any principal sorting due to trends, 
then our main results understate the value of principals. 
 
C. Match Effects 
  Our analysis thus far provides estimates of principal effects that are fixed across schools (and 
time). It is entirely plausible, however, that a principal’s effectiveness varies across schools. These 
“match effects” might arise if a principal’s effect on student achievement depends on things like 
interactions with the existing teaching staff, demographic composition of the student body, location 
preference of the principal, or any other complementarity between the principal and school. If principals 
sort themselves into schools where they have good matches, our principal effect estimates will be biased 
upward since they partly measure the impact of fixed principal characteristics and partly the impact of the 
match. Match effects are also important in their own right because their existence implies that considering 
the school to which a principal is assigned is crucial in terms of improving student achievement in 
particular schools and reducing achievement gaps. 21 
 
  In this section we provide estimates of principal-school matches. Woodcock (2008) outlines two 
different methods for estimation. The first is the orthogonal fixed effects estimator, which identifies 
match effects by imposing that they are orthogonal to the principal and school effects.
25 This estimator 
has one major downside: it mechanically forces match effects to sum to zero for each principal and 
school. Thus, matches with one principal or school are assigned a zero match effect, which is not 
desirable. Therefore, while we provide orthogonal fixed effects estimates, we prefer the hybrid random 
effects estimator. This method avoids the issues with orthogonal fixed effects, but comes at the cost of 
imposing orthogonality between the principal, school, match, and residual.
26  
Table 7 presents the match effects estimates. Columns 2 and 4 in Panel A report the standard 
deviations from the orthogonal fixed effects estimator, alongside the results from our main specification 
in columns 1 and 3 for comparison. For both math and reading scores, the principal and school effects are 
identical regardless of whether match effects are included. The match effects themselves are small 
relative to the principal and school effects: the standard deviation is 0.033 in math and 0.034 in reading.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results of our preferred hybrid random effects estimator. For 
comparison, we also estimate the hybrid random effects model without match effects in columns 1 and 3. 
The standard deviation of the principal effects in columns 1 and 3 are much smaller than their 
corresponding fixed effect estimates from Panel A, but is of a similar magnitude to the Empirical Bayes 
estimates from Table 5. Columns 2 and 4 contain the hybrid random effects estimates with match effects. 
Here differences emerge in the size of the standard deviations. The standard deviation of the principal 
effect for math drops to 0.093, and the corresponding estimate for reading drops to 0.059. The school 
effect is roughly unchanged. Match effects are large with a standard deviation of about 0.160 for both 
                                                 
25 The estimator proceeds by estimating the parameters in β and the experience effects by OLS using principal by 
school fixed effects (i.e., match fixed effects). It then take the residual plus fixed effects from that regression, 
computes within-match means, and regresses those on separate principal and school fixed effects. The residuals 
from this second regression are the match effects. 
26 This estimator has the same first step as the orthogonal fixed effects estimator, which allows arbitrary correlation 
between the fixed components and the regressors in the model. The variances of the principal, school, and match 
effects are then estimated via Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML). The variances reported in Table 7 are the 
REML estimates. 22 
 
math and for reading—roughly five times larger than the estimates derived from the fixed effects 
estimation.  
Match effects have important implications for policy. That match effects appear to matter more 
than fixed principal effects (given random effects estimates) on their own implies that policy makers 
could not simply assign “good” principals to any school and expect them to have the same impact. A 
principal’s effect depends on the school where they are located, so if principals are rotated across schools 
in part to help improve student performance, the key will be to assign them to a school with the best 
match so they will have maximum impact. These estimates must be considered somewhat cautiously, 
however, because estimating them requires pushing the data very hard and/or imposing some restrictions. 
Fortunately, even when match effects are included, the fixed principal effects still exert a substantial 




D. Principal Experience 
  The effects of fixed principal characteristics on student achievement are the focus of this paper, 
but we also have data on principal experience, which is an important characteristic of principals that may 
impact student achievement. In our regressions, we separately analyze the effect on student performance 
of principal tenure in a school and overall principal experience. We model principal tenure with a set of 
dummy variables for each level of experience up to five years and a dummy for any amount of experience 
five years and over, with one year of experience as the excluded group. We model overall principal 
experience using dummies for groups of four to six, seven to ten, and ten or more years, with one to three 
years as the excluded group. With overall experience, these groupings reflect the fact that we are less 
interested in the yearly changes in experience, and more interested in comparing inexperienced to 
                                                 
27 Unfortunately, the British Columbia data does not contain matches between students and teachers. Therefore, with 
these data we cannot explore interactions effects between "good" teachers and "good" principals. 23 
 
somewhat experienced to very experienced principals. With principal experience at a school, we are more 
interested in how one-year changes in experience affect student scores. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results from specifications that include our measures of principal 
tenure at a school. Columns 1 and 3 display estimates when school fixed effects are not included in the 
model. In these specifications, there is no distinct relationship between experience and student 
performance, except that principals who have been at a school for five years or longer boost test scores 
slightly. Including school fixed effects in columns 2 and 4 does little to change the pattern across years of 
experience, except that experienced principals no longer exert any influence on math scores. 
These results contrast with those of Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009), who find that principal 
experience still matters with math scores, but less for reading scores when principal and school fixed 
effects are held constant.
28 There are several factors that might explain differences in our results, most of 
which are speculative since we cannot formally test these differences. First, differences between the New 
York City and British Columbia school systems could be responsible. Their research suggests that New 
York City recently has placed a great amount of emphasis on their principals. This emphasis may not 
have been seen in British Columbia.
29 A second explanation is differences in the degree to which sorting 
causes bias. Both our study and theirs control for similar demographics and other characteristics in 
addition to fixed school and principal factors, so this is not likely to be the issue.  
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results of using overall principal experience rather than school 
tenure. With no school fixed effects in the model, the most experienced principals increase student scores 
by 0.055 standard deviations in math and by 0.069 standard deviations in reading relative to the least 
experienced principals. Once we control for school effects, however, the pattern disappears, leaving no 
                                                 
28 In their paper, Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009) use principal by school effects rather than separate principal 
and school effects, as they are not interested in interpreting either fixed effect. In practice, both methods give similar 
results. 
29 For example, several very unique and intensive programs designed to train principals to become effective leaders 
are available to individuals in the New York system, such as the Aspiring Principals Program (APP). It is not clear 
that British Columbia principals have access to similar types of intensive training programs. 24 
 
relationship between experience and test scores. Overall, we find no evidence of any systematic 
relationship between experience and student achievement. 
These results are interesting as they suggest that experience does not matter. This is important 
from a policy perspective since it suggests that if the goal is to boost performance of underperforming 
students, and reduce achievement gaps, a more effective approach would be to identify high-ability 
principals and then allocate them to schools, rather than relying on a principal to boost performance by 
gaining experience.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
We estimate the impact of fixed principal characteristics on student performance. Results show 
that principals have a substantial impact on both math and reading scores. Our main results show that a 
one standard deviation shift up the principal quality distribution can increase achievement by 
approximately 0.2 standard deviations in math and reading. When we extend the model to allow the 
effectiveness of the principal to depend on the school where s/he is employed, our most robust model 
shows that a one standard deviation improvement in principal quality increases math scores by about 0.1 
standardized units and reading scores by 0.06 standardized units. Additionally, a quality match improves 
student performance by approximately 0.15 standard deviations in math and in reading. We also estimate 
that a more experienced principal within a school or overall has no significant effect on student 
achievement.  
These results have important implications for policy. The main implication is that shifting 
principals between schools has the potential to significantly reduce achievement gaps.
30 Some of this 
improvement depends on where the principal works, but a sizable portion is portable across schools. 
Policy makers could identify the most effective principals, and allocate them between schools to 
potentially reduce achievement gaps. Alternatively, we could identify the best principals and dig deeper to 
                                                 
30 However, the optimal reassignment of existing principals, with respect to a gap-minimizing objective function, 
might affect the supply of effective principals.  25 
 
learn more about the attributes that make them so effective. Information gleaned from that exercise could 
be used to train underperforming principals. What are the fixed characteristics that make one principal 
better than another? We cannot identify these in our data, but prior literature can shed some light on this 
issue. The results of Clark, Martorell, and Rockoff (2009) show that education level and pre-principal 
experience are not likely to be among the factors, while the evidence on training programs is mixed. 
Principals are most likely to affect student outcomes via their policies. Figlio and Sass (2010) show that 
when a new principal enters a school, that individual is most likely to change policies on teacher 
incentives, curriculum, and those policies that boost performance of low-achieving students. They further 
show that the most effective principals focus on policies that boost performance of low-achieving 
students. Finally, Jacob (2010) shows that principals are likely instrumental in the hiring and firing 
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Table 1
Principal characteristics in British Columbia, 1999-2006
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total Employed 1355 1362 1357 1325 1280 1274 1259 1255
New Hires 150 136 145 117 122 139 178 169
Mobility
Same school 74% 77% 77% 72% 73% 72% 69%
Different school 15% 12% 11% 15% 13% 11% 13%
Out of sample 10% 12% 12% 13% 14% 17% 18%
Tenure at a school
1 yr 22% 25% 22% 21% 24% 26% 26% 29%
2 yrs 18% 19% 23% 21% 18% 21% 22% 22%
3 yrs 20% 14% 15% 19% 17% 15% 18% 16%
4 yrs 13% 15% 10% 12% 15% 12% 11% 11%
5+ yrs 27% 26% 29% 27% 25% 27% 23% 21%
Experience as principal
1 to 3 yrs 30% 28% 29% 28% 28% 27% 32% 35%
4 to 6 yrs 26% 32% 23% 24% 22% 24% 21% 20%
7 to 9 yrs 16% 11% 19% 20% 23% 19% 18% 16%
10+ yrs 28% 29% 29% 29% 28% 30% 29% 29%
Notes: Numbers in this table are based on 10,467 principal-year observations, 2505 principals, and 1527 schools.
The sample includes all elementary, middle, elementary-secondary, and junior secondary schools in British
Columbia. Some principals are observed in multiple schools in the same year in certain rural locations. For these
cases, we kept the principal's "main" school, which we define as the school in which the principal is observed
most often. New hire is defined as a principal who is observed in the data for the first time as a principal.40
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for student data
Mean Std Dev.
4th grade test scores
Math 0.071 0.922
Reading  0.080 0.891
7th grade test scores
Math 0.020 0.934





In special education 0.059 0.236
Attends rural school 0.126 0.331
Neighbourhood census characteristics
Percent over 65 yrs old 0.135 0.060
Percent visible minority 0.214 0.226
Percent immigrant 0.248 0.157
Percent unemployed 0.056 0.031
Percent no high school degree 0.220 0.072
Percent high school degree 0.279 0.036
Percent university degree 0.207 0.100
Average household income 60,823 16,815
Average dwelling value 306,313 139,547
Number of observations
Notes: Test scores represent the z-score by year, grade, and subject among the 
population of students prior to sample exclusions. There are 1323 principals and 
912 schools in the estimation sample.
183,623Table 3
Average principal, school, and neighbourhood characteristics for identified and unidentified principals
All principals Identified principals Unidentified principals
(1) (2) (3)
Principal characteristics
Principal tenure 3.16 2.87 4.40
Principal experience 6.65 6.28 8.23
Number of years in data 2.95 2.79 3.65
Number of principals 1323 1077 246
School characteristics
7th grade math score -0.040 -0.028 -0.095
7th grade reading score -0.049 -0.041 -0.088
Excused from 7th grade math test 0.055 0.057 0.045
Excused from 7th grade reading test 0.053 0.056 0.043
Percent male 0.516 0.516 0.513
Percent aboriginal 0.138 0.135 0.147
Percent ESL 0.234 0.244 0.190
Percent special education 0.096 0.097 0.094
Rural school 0.215 0.206 0.255
Neighbourhood census characteristics
Percent over 65 yrs old 0.133 0.131 0.143
Percent visible minority 0.203 0.213 0.160
Percent no high school degree 0.234 0.234 0.231
Percent high school degree 0.277 0.276 0.277
Percent university degree 0.198 0.198 0.196
Percent immigrant 0.237 0.243 0.210
Percent unemployed 0.062 0.062 0.065
Average household income 59071 59451 57407
Average dwelling value 293240 297450 274807
Notes: Data based on regression sample of 183,623 observations. Average school characteristics and average 
neighbourhood characteristics are computed by averaging all students observed in grade 7 in a school. The 
number of connected groups for the identified principals is 311.Table 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
7th grade math score 0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.002 -0.026 -0.017
(0.015) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.026) (0.032)
7th grade reading score 0.026 0.005 0.022 0.000 0.028 0.031
(0.014) (0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031)
Lagged 7th grade math score -0.006 -0.014
(0.024) (0.031)
Lagged 7th grade reading score 0.004 0.006
(0.022) (0.029)
Percent excused from 7th grade math test -0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.011 -0.010
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
Percent excused from 7th grade reading test 0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.014 0.009 0.002
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.023)
School enrolment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of elementary teachers in school 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Percent ESL -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Percent male -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Percent aboriginal 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.013
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009)
Percent special education 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Average household income -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 0.002 0.007 -0.004
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012)
Percent no high school degree -0.020 -0.052 -0.039 -0.022 -0.045 -0.037
(0.010) (0.021) (0.025) (0.013) (0.028) (0.033)
Percent high school degree -0.015 -0.034 -0.028 -0.031 -0.046 -0.039
(0.012) (0.022) (0.026) (0.016) (0.029) (0.034)
Percent university degree -0.017 -0.002 0.006 -0.020 -0.006 0.000
(0.010) (0.026) (0.032) (0.013) (0.035) (0.043)
Percent unemployed 0.010 0.027 0.018 0.010 -0.012 -0.027
(0.010) (0.021) (0.025) (0.013) (0.028) (0.033)
Percent immigrant -0.008 -0.022 0.012 0.006 -0.031 0.002
(0.011) (0.028) (0.032) (0.015) (0.036) (0.042)
Percent visible minority 0.010 0.018 0.000 -0.002 0.015 0.007
(0.008) (0.021) (0.025) (0.010) (0.028) (0.033)
Average value of dwelling 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Percent 65+ years old -0.044 0.022 -0.149 -0.056 0.222 0.164
(0.078) (0.249) (0.296) (0.102) (0.328) (0.392)
4 to 6 yrs principal experience 0.052 0.116 0.113 0.064 0.178 0.183
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
7 to 9 yrs principal experience 0.031 0.139 0.135 0.062 0.263 0.285
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.025)
10+ yrs principal experience 0.007 0.158 0.162 0.087 0.390 0.428
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.026)
R squared 0.017 0.027 0.027 0.017 0.066 0.074
Number of observations 6458 6458 5254 6458 6458 5254
Additional control variables:
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Regression of principal turnover on school  and neighbourhood characteristics
School to school switch Any switch
Notes: Data for this regression are at the school by year level, and include all schools that offer the grade 7 numeracy and 
reading tests from 1999-2005. A small number of principals who serve at 2 schools in the same year are exluded from the 
regression. School to school switch refers to all principal mobility from one school in the sample to another. Any switches refers 
to school switches plus switches to schools outside the sample or exits from the sample.41
Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Standard deviation 0.336 0.309 0.288 0.231 0.167 0.318 0.309 0.276 0.224 0.158
Adjusted standard deviation 0.321 0.293 0.270 0.196 0.207 0.302 0.292 0.258 0.188 0.199
10th percentile -0.349 -0.298 -0.286 -0.265 -0.191 -0.259 -0.231 -0.227 -0.219 -0.154
25th percentile -0.175 -0.150 -0.149 -0.120 -0.087 -0.097 -0.080 -0.094 -0.097 -0.068
50th percentile -0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.010 0.007 0.039 0.039 0.027 0.002 0.001
75th percentile 0.196 0.162 0.157 0.116 0.084 0.167 0.148 0.136 0.102 0.072
90th percentile 0.395 0.335 0.319 0.265 0.191 0.273 0.250 0.244 0.225 0.159
(75th percentile - median) 0.202 0.159 0.165 0.106 0.076 0.128 0.109 0.108 0.100 0.070
number of principals 1323 1323 1077 1077 1077 1323 1323 1077 1077 1077
number of schools 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912 912
P-value on F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Control variables:
Demographics no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Census no yes yes yes  yes  no yes yes yes  yes 
School fixed effects no no no yes yes no no no yes yes
Student level estimates of principal fixed effects, 4th to 7th grade gains
Math Reading
Notes: Figures in this table represent the distribution among all 1323 or 1077 principal effects estimated via equation 1. See Section VII.A. for a
description of the demographic and census variables included in the regressions. Coefficients are measured in standard deviations. The p-value on
the F-test is the test for the joint significance of all principal fixed effects in the model. Estimates in columns 5 and 10 are Empirical Bayes
shrinkage estimates.42
Table 6
Estimates of principal fixed effects using different samples, 4th to 7th grade gains
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 7th grade principals*
Standard deviation 0.145 0.115 0.137 0.105
Adjusted standard deviation 0.129 0.133 0.120 0.124
Panel B: All principals 5th-7th grades* 
Standard deviation 0.314 0.196 0.263 0.124
Adjusted standard deviation 0.248 0.274 0.181 0.228
Panel C: Students with same principal: 5th-7th grades 
Standard deviation 0.274 0.204 0.241 0.165
Adjusted standard deviation 0.236 0.246 0.199 0.214
Panel D: Students in same school 
Standard deviation 0.284 0.204 0.276 0.196
Adjusted standard deviation 0.241 0.254 0.233 0.246
Panel E: School-Specific Linear Trends
Standard deviation 0.410 0.220 0.382 0.179
Adjusted standard deviation 0.300 0.355 0.262 0.331
Control variables:
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Census yes yes yes yes
School fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Reading
Notes: See Section VII.A. for a description of the demographic and census variables included in the regressions. 
Estimates in columns 2 and 4 are Empirical Bayes shrinkage estimates. Panel A includes sample of 1077 
principals and 912 schools. Panel B includes sample of 1660 principals and 1191 schools. Panel C includes 
sample of 337 principals and 763 schools. Panel D includes sample of 947 principals and 798 schools. In Panel E, 




Principal/School Match effects Principal/School Match effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Orthogonal fixed effects estimates
Standard deviation for principal 0.231 0.231 0.224 0.224
Standard deviation for school 0.327 0.327 0.319 0.319
Standard deviation for match 0.033 0.034
Panel B: Hybrid random effect estimates
Standard deviation for principal 0.181 0.093 0.166 0.059
Standard deviation for school 0.220 0.211 0.208 0.202
Standard deviation for match 0.160 0.160
Notes: All regression include all demographic and census control variables listed in Section VII.A. Fixed Effects estimates
are based on 1077 principals, 662 schools, and 1449 matches between 1999 and 2006. Random Effects estimates based on
1323 principals, 912 schools, and 1699 matches. Restricting the random effects estimates to include only principals, schools,
and matches in the fixed effects regressions does not significantly change results. Principal/School refers to the pure principal
and school effects model, and match effects refers to the model with principal school interactions. Standard deviations are
based on the unadjusted fixed effects estimates. In the fixed effects models, principal, school, and match effects are centered
within connected groups. Standard deviations in random effects models are estimated by REML.
Estimates of match effects
Math Reading44
Table 8
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Years of experience at school
4th grade score 0.522 0.520 0.483 0.480
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
2 yrs school experience 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
3 yrs school experience -0.005 -0.018 0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
4 yrs school experience 0.012 -0.023 0.007 -0.020
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012)
5+ yrs school experience 0.051 -0.009 0.058 0.002
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016)
Panel B: Years of experience as a principal
4th grade score 0.522 0.520 0.483 0.480
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
4 to 6 yrs principal experience 0.024 -0.016 0.024 -0.002
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
7 to 9 yrs principal experience 0.033 -0.022 0.041 -0.022
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016)
10+ yrs principal experience 0.055 -0.005 0.069 -0.004
(0.009) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022)
Control variables:
Principal fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Census yes yes  yes yes 
School fixed effects no yes no yes
Math Reading
Regression coefficients for experience measures
Notes: Coefficients in this table correspond to the models in Table 5. Bolded numbers represent
significance at the 5% level. Coefficients are measures in standard deviations. See Section VII.A. for a
full list of demographic and census measures.  45
Appendix Table 1
Descriptive statistics for the student data in Table 6
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
4th grade test scores
Math 0.073 0.920 0.079 0.915 0.087 0.915 0.114 0.904
Reading  0.081 0.889 0.089 0.881 0.099 0.874 0.122 0.857
7th grade test scores
Math 0.021 0.933 0.029 0.929 0.106 0.933 0.121 0.931
Reading  0.069 0.898 0.076 0.890 0.118 0.879 0.129 0.871
Demographics
ESL 0.209 0.406 0.210 0.408 0.246 0.431 0.242 0.428
Male 0.504 0.500 0.504 0.500 0.502 0.500 0.505 0.500
Aboriginal 0.102 0.303 0.099 0.299 0.087 0.282 0.082 0.274
In special education 0.059 0.235 0.059 0.235 0.054 0.226 0.053 0.224
Attends rural school 0.125 0.331 0.121 0.326 0.144 0.351 0.135 0.342
Neighbourhood census characteristics
Percent over 65 yrs old 0.135 0.060 0.135 0.060 0.129 0.064 0.130 0.061
Percent visible minority 0.214 0.226 0.217 0.227 0.262 0.250 0.261 0.249
Percent no high school degree 0.220 0.072 0.219 0.072 0.223 0.080 0.220 0.079
Percent high school degree 0.279 0.036 0.279 0.037 0.277 0.040 0.277 0.041
Percent university degree 0.207 0.100 0.208 0.100 0.218 0.108 0.220 0.110
Percent immigrant 0.248 0.157 0.250 0.157 0.279 0.171 0.280 0.171
Percent unemployed 0.056 0.031 0.056 0.030 0.057 0.035 0.056 0.035
Average household income 60,837 16,816 60,993 16,837 62,618 19,482 62,968 19,330
Average dwelling value 306,454 139,531 308,123 139,449 323,423 158,408 327,997 158,527
Number of observations
Estimation Sample
Notes: Test scores represent the z-score by year, grade, and subject among the population of schools prior to sample exclusions.  
7th grade principals Same principal Same school
183,066 57,360 92,156
5th-7th grade principals
179,062